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PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES: A
MORAL, LEGAL, AND CIVIC DUTY
LAURA R. HANDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
As this Essay is being written, two prize-winning reporters
from major news organizations are facing imprisonment for
doing their jobs and one reporter has served four months home
detention. They are facing imprisonment for reporting on mat-
ters of utmost public concern: in one case, the corruption of a
local public official and, in the case of the other two reporters,
allegations that a top administration official revealed the identity
of a covert CIA agent in order to impugn or intimidate a critic of
the administration's basis for going to war in Iraq.' They are fac-
ing imprisonment not for what they wrote, but because they insist
on keeping their promise of confidentiality to their sources,
rather than tell a grand jury who gave them the information.
They face imprisonment, not because they did anything illegal in
obtaining the information, but because their sources may have
done something unlawful in disclosing the information-wholly
* Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP. Ms. Handman has defended a
number of media organizations in response to subpoenas for disclosure of
sources and authored amicus briefs on behalf of media organizations in appeals
involving reporter's privilege. Amber Husbands, an associate at Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP, assisted in the preparation of this Essay.
1. Jim Taricani of WJAR in Providence, Rhode Island refused to reveal
the identity of the person who leaked him an FBI videotape of a politician tak-
ing a bribe and was found by a district court judge to be in civil contempt, a
ruling upheld by the First Circuit. In re Special Proceedings, Nos. 03-2052 & 04-
1383 (1st Cir. June 21, 2004). The trial judge suspended the fine in November,
after WJAR had paid $85,000 in fines, holding that the penalty had not
achieved its goal. On November 18, 2004, Mr. Taricani was convicted of crimi-
nal contempt. He was sentenced to six months home detention on December
9, 2004. Taricani was released after four months, on April 9, 2005, after peti-
tioning the judge for early release.
In October 2004, a federal district court held reporters Matt Cooper of
Time magazine and Judith Miller of the New York Times in contempt for not
complying with a court order to reveal the name of the confidential source who
exposed Valerie Plame as a CIA agent and sentenced the reporters to up to
eighteen months imprisonment. The ruling was affirmed on appeal to the D.C.
Circuit and a petition for rehearing en banc was denied on April 19, 2005. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, No.
04-3138 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 2005). The reporters are likely to seek review by the
United States Supreme Court.
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truthful information the source believed was important for the
public to know.
This Essay will reflect on the inherent tension between the
legitimate needs of law enforcement and the legitimate needs in
a democracy of citizens for information about their government.
There are moral, ethical, civic, and legal consequences if report-
ers can rely on confidential sources only at peril of their own
liberty. Such an outcome will greatly reduce the information
available to make wise social and political decisions and to be an
effective watchdog against government and corporate abuse.
The balance set by the First Amendment argues against such a
result, albeit at some cost to law enforcement. This Essay argues
for a federal shield law to join those of thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia to protect journalists from being forced to
choose between their obligations to their sources to keep
promises of confidentiality, their obligation as citizens to provide
evidence for legitimate investigation of unlawful activity, and
their obligation as members of the Fourth Estate to inform the
public of matters of public concern.
I. REPORTERS' CORE ETicAL OBLIGATION: CONFIDENTIALITY
It is a sacred tenet of journalistic ethics that reporters
"[r]ecognize the need to protect confidential sources"' and
"promise confidentiality only with the intention of keeping that
promise."' The promise of confidentiality has legal, as well as
moral, force.4
Some of our country's most significant political stories have
come to light through the efforts of confidential sources. In the
Pentagon Papers case, for example, the press published highly
2. RADIo-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECToRs ASSOCIATION, CODE OF BROADCAST
ETHICS 4 (1987), reprinted in JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM
10-11 (2d ed. 1995).
3. Id.; see also AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF
PRINCI .s art. VI (1975 ed.) ("Pledges of confidentiality to news sources must
be honored at all costs, and therefore should not be given lightly."); SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS, art. 111 (5) (1987 ed.), reprinted in
BLACK ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-8 ("Journalists acknowledge the newsman's
ethic of protecting confidential sources of information."); id. at 199 ("Once you
promise confidentiality, keep your promise," even if it requires "go[ing] tojail."). Indeed, "[t]he reputation of a reporter or newspaper or television sta-
tion has for protecting sources who provide sensitive information is part of the
continuing dynamic of successful journalism." Id. at 197; JACK FULLER, NEWS
VALUES 65 (1996) (arguing that a newspaper must "protect[ ] the integrity of its
promises" of confidentiality).
4. Cowles v. Cohen Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that a
source can enforce promise of confidentiality). 0
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classified documents concerning the governmental policies that
entangled the United States in Vietnam, despite the fact that the
documents were "feloniously acquired" by an unnamed source.
In the Watergate investigation, reporters Woodward and Bern-
stein received and relied upon information regarding the misuse
of presidential campaign funds from a confidential source
known as "Deep Throat."
6
In the years since Watergate, some of the biggest stories
involving government corruption or deception have resulted
from information provided by confidential sources, involving
such topics as how the FBI's Surreptitious Entry Program rou-
tinely broke into people's homes and offices; how the United
States masterminded a 1953 coup d'etat in Iran; how a sitting
U.S. senator was potentially abusing his authority,7 the Iran-Con-
tra "arms for hostages" deal; and the Anita Hill story that almost
derailed a Supreme Court nomination.' One empirical study
found that forty-two percent of former federal officials who occu-
pied policymaking positions stated that they had provided confi-
dential information to the press during their tenure in office.9
More recently, the reporters who broke the Abu Ghraib
prison scandal received photographs and other information
from unidentified sourcesY° After the initial stories were pub-
lished, other soldiers, who also requested anonymity, came for-
ward with more evidence." Later, unidentified sources within
the military provided a reporter with internal records from the
Pentagon indicating investigations in some seventy-five cases of
detainee abuse, including twenty-seven abuse cases involving
5. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 754 (1971)
(Harlan,].' dissenting).
6. CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 69-70
(1974).
7. See DAVID BURNHAM, ABOVE THE LAw: SECRET DEALS, POLITICAL FIXES,
AND OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 130-34, n.1
(1996) ;James Risen, Special Report: The C.LA. in Iran-How a Plot Convulsed Iran
in '53 (and in'79), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at Al; Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d
701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
8. See American Notes: Investigations-Getting to the Source, TIME , Feb. 17,
1992, at 37.
9. MARTIN LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAK-
INC 172 (1986).
10. See Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004,
at 42.
11. See Todd Richissin, Soldiers' Warnings Ignored-Failures: The Blame for
What Happened at Abu Ghraib Goes Far Beyond the Military Police, Intelligence Soldiers
Say, BALT. SUN, May 9, 2004, at Al.
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deaths; at least eight believed to be homicides. 2 Without the
press's reliance on anonymous sources, the Abu Ghraib prison
abuses would not have been reported to the public.
Reporters also rely upon confidential sources to investigate
important stories outside the political arena. For example,
reporters relied upon confidential sources in their investigation
of the Enron accounting fraud scandal.' 3 Recent stories detail-
ing how cigarette companies manipulate nicotine delivery in
their products and how such companies have suppressed infor-
mation regarding the health risks of tobacco were made possible
only by the transmission of stolen documents that the companies
claimed were subject to a judicial protective order.'4 A Pulitzer
Prize-winning series of articles reported on more than 230 fertil-
ity fraud stories, exposing cover-ups, intimidation of clinic
employees, and hush money payments. As a result, the clinic in
question closed, families learned the true biological origins of
their children, and the American Medical Association issued new
guidelines for fertility clinics. Although all of the individuals
quoted in the stories were identified, the reporter relied upon
clinic records she had obtained from unidentified sources. 15
Reporters may not have been able to provide the public with
these kinds of groundbreaking stories without the ability to
promise confidentiality to their sources.1 6
II. COURTS RECOGNIZE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE GROUNDED IN
FIRsT AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[t]he consti-
tutional guarantee of a free press . . . secures 'the paramount
public interest in a free flow of information to the people con-
cerning public officials."' 17 Accordingly, "news gathering is not
12. Miles Moffeit, Brutal Interrogation in Iraq: Five Detainees' Deaths Probed,
DENVER POST, May 19, 2004, at Al.
13. See REBECCA SMITH & JOHN EMSCHWILLER, 24 DAYS: How Two WALL
STREET JOURNAL REPORTERS UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN
CORPORATE AMERICA 47-56, 70-75, 258-60 (2003).
14. See AMix M. Freedman, Inside the Soul of Marlboro, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18,
1995, at Al; Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Was Silent on Hazards, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1994, at Al.
15. Susan Kelleher's series, titled "Fertility Fraud," was published in the
Orange County Register between March and November 1995.
16. See, e.g., Affidavits of Matthew Cooper, Scott Armstrong, Jack Nelson,
and Anna Nelson, Attached as Appendices to Brief of Appellants, In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 04-3138, 04-3139 & 04-3140).
17. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (quoting Garrison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)).
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without its First Amendment protections." 8 As numerous courts
of appeals have observed, routinely compelling "disclosure of...
confidential [sources] would clearly jeopardize the ability ofjour-
nalists and the media to gather information and, therefore, have
a chilling effect on speech."1 This is especially so with respect to
"reporting on governmental affairs," and "the axiom is almost
always: the more important a story, the more likely the need for
confidentiality."2"
Federal courts have recognized a reporter's privilege
grounded in the First Amendment that provides journalists with
a qualified right to resist efforts to compel testimony about their
confidential sources or about unpublished information gained in
the course of researching a story. In Branzburg v. Hayes,2 four
members of the Supreme Court held that there is no privilege on
the part of the media to refuse to testify before the grand jury.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, however, held that courts
should strike "a proper balance between freedom of the press
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with
respect to criminal conduct."2 2 In the three decades since, many
courts interpreting Branzburg have held that Justice Powell's
opinion, prescribing a balance of First Amendment and law
enforcement interests, is controlling.2 3 Other courts have more
recently held that, at least in the grand jury context, Branzburg
18. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
19. United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (1st Cir.
1988); see also Ashcroft v. Conoco Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) ("If
reporters were routinely required to divulge the identities of their sources, the
free flow of newsworthy information would be restrained and the public's
understanding of important issues and events would be hampered in ways
inconsistent with a healthy republic."); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) ("Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a source may sig-
nificantly interfere with this news gathering ability.").
20. John E. Osborn, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the
Empirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. Rrv. 57,
73-74 (1985) (quotation omitted) (noting that the journalists nominated for a
Pulitzer Prize used confidential sources in about one-third of their stories, but
in a much higher percentage of stories involving governmental affairs or other
"major" issues).
21. 408 U.S. at 710.
22. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., Bruno v. Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Corp., 633 F.2d
583, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1980);
LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986);
Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980); Cervantes v.
Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992 & n. 9 (8th Cir. 1972); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d
464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1975); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 563 F.2d 433, 436-37
(10th Cir. 1977); Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711-12.
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provided no privilege to refuse to disclose confidential sources. 2 4
The very existence of reporter's privilege is currently before
appellate courts and may reach the United States Supreme Court
this term.
However the privilege is ultimately interpreted, the First
Amendment clearly does not relieve a reporter of all civic duty to
provide testimony concerning a crime that he witnesses.25 Every
citizen-including a reporter-has an obligation to give evi-
dence. The law has long recognized a "general duty" on the part
of citizens called before official proceedings to "give what testi-
mony one is capable of giving."26
The law recognizes numerous exceptions to this obligation,
however, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the law-
yer-client privilege, spousal privileges, physician-patient privilege,
the clergy-penitent privilege, and, most recently, the psychother-
apist-patient privilege recognized in Jaffee v. Redmond.2 7 These
privileges reflect a societal value placed on the ability to withhold
evidence, no matter how probative, no matter if available from
no other source, in order to "promote[ ] sufficiently important
interests" 8 which "outweigh the need for probative evidence." 29
While the legal duty to answer a subpoena and supply a
grand jury or a court with relevant information does not target
the press, that legal duty has a particularly devastating effect on
reporters' ability to gain the confidence of sources who can pro-
vide them with the information crucial to investigating important
and newsworthy stories. If potential informants believe that a
subpoena can convert the media into "an investigative arm of the
government," they will be far less likely to share controversial
24. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.
2005); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003); Storer Com-
muns. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Shain, 978 F.2d
850, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1992); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1090-92
(9th Cir. 1972); In re Special Counsel Investigations, Nos. 04-MS-407, 04-MS-461
& 04-MS-460 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2004 and Nov. 10, 2004) (orders); Lee v. United
States Dept. of Justice, 287 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17-18 (D.D.C. 2003).
25. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 700-01 (finding that the government has an
interest "in extirpating the traffic in illegal drugs, in forestalling assassination
attempts on the President, and in preventing the community from being dis-
rupted by violent disorders endangering both persons and property" and "the
grand jury called these reporters as they would others-because it was likely
that they could supply information to help the government determine whether
illegal conduct had occurred and, if it had, whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to return an indictment").
26. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
27. 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996) (summarizing other evidentiary privileges).
28. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
29. Id.
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information."0 Because of their investigative activities, reporters
are more likely to be targets of subpoenas."' Sources seek confi-
dentiality usually out of a well-grounded fear of retaliation and
will be less likely to provide information if they risk disclosure.
Reporters may be forced to decline to print newsworthy items
from confidential sources if they believe that courts will not
respect the need to preserve confidentiality. Reporters must now
also factor in the potential consequences of publishing stories
based on information from confidential sources, consequences
that currently include substantial fines and jail time. 32
Curbing an over-reliance on confidential sources may not be
all bad where confidentiality is not truly vital to get the informa-
tion, where the source does not want to be identified because of
risk of embarrassment rather than retaliation, where the source,
hiding behind anonymity, provides deliberately false informa-
tion, or where the story itself does not involve disclosure of seri-
ous abuse. Unfortunately, refusal of any kind of protection
would likely quash the important whistleblower stories that will
not otherwise be told as well as celebrity gossip or other stories of
less public moment.
III. WEIGHING NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AGAINST NEED
FOR EVIDENCE
Courts must balance the needs of the reporter's privilege
against the needs of the litigant seeking the information. In
some situations the need for the information will be much more
compelling than in others. For example, the situation in which
confidential sources are most likely to be protected is one in
which a reporter is merely a third-party witness in a civil lawsuit:
In general, when striking the balance between the civil liti-
gant's interest in compelled disclosure and the public
interest in protecting a newspaper's confidential sources,
30. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell,J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Osborn, supra note 20, at 66, 74.
31. The Second Circuit recently held that "permitting litigants
unrestricted, court-enforced access to journalistic resources would risk the sym-
bolic harm of making journalists appear to be an investigative arm of the judi-
cial system, the government, or private parties." Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29,
35 (2d Cir. 1999).
32. See Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 25, 2004). Jim Tari-
cani reported in an interview that other reporters have told him that, in view of
his potential jail term, they will back away from relying on confidential sources.
See also Affidavits of Matthew Cooper, Scott Armstrong, Jack Nelson, and Anna
Nelson, Attached as Appendices to Brief of Appellants, In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena (Miller) (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 04-3138, 04-3139 & 04-3140).
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we will be mindful of the preferred position of the First
Amendment and the importance of a vigorous press ....
Thus in the ordinary case the civil litigant's interest in dis-
closure should yield to the journalist's privilege. Indeed, if
the privilege does not prevail in all but the most excep-
tional cases, its value will be substantially diminished. 3
Even in civil cases where the reporters are merely third-party
witnesses, these cautions have been recently dismissed. In the
Privacy Act civil claim against the government for leaking details
of the investigation of Wen Ho Lee, five reporters from four
major news organizations have been ordered to reveal their
sources.3 4 They have refused and have been found in con-
tempt.3 5 The order requiring disclosure did not first determine,
as a threshold matter, whether the identity of the agency or indi-
vidual source was necessary to establish an otherwise meritorious
claim, instead finding no reporter's privilege and, if there was
one, it had been overcome.36 Reporters have also been subpoe-
naed in the Privacy Act claim brought against the United States
by Stephen Hatfill, the scientist named by the Attorney General
as a "person of interest" in the anthrax investigation. Before a
single government agent has been questioned, the testimony of
reporters has been sought as a first resort, not a last resort.3 7
Further along the continuum is a situation in which a
reporter is himself a defendant in a civil defamation suit. In Her-
bert v. Lando," the Supreme Court held that there is no First
Amendment privilege barring a plaintiff in a defamation lawsuit
from inquiring into the editorial process because of the burden
on the plaintiff to prove actual malice. Courts must evaluate how
critical or necessary the information is, whether available from
other sources, and whether the claim has substantial merit if the
confidential information were disclosed.3 9 In addition, the con-
33. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (1981).
34. Lee v. United States Dept. of Justice, 287 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17-18
(D.D.C. 2003); Lee v. United States Dept. of Justice, 327 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29
(D.D.C. 2004).
35. Lee, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 17-18. The appeal is scheduled for argument
on May 9, 2005.
36. Id.
37. Hatfill v. Ashcroft ct al., No. 1:03cv1793 (D.D.C motions to quash
filed Jan. 28, 2005).
38. 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979).
39. See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, modifted,
628 F.2d 932, 932 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that plaintiff must show "substantial
evidence that the challenged statement ... is both factually untrue and defama-
tory"); In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1980) (describing this thresh-
old requirement); Bruno & Stillman v. Globe Newspapers Co., 633 F.2d 583,
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sequences of non-disclosure in a defamation case need not be jail
or a fine but can result in an evidentiary presumption against the
news organization or allow the jury to draw an inference from
the reporter's non-disclosure.40
In a suit against the Boston Globe arising out of stories about
experimental chemotherapy treatments that resulted in a fatal
overdose at a leading cancer clinic, the consequences for the
news organization were carried to a new extreme.4 1 A default
judgment was entered against the Globe for its refusal to disclose a
confidential source which the plaintiff, the doctor involved in the
fatal treatment, said was necessary in her claims, not against the
Globe, but against the clinic. Ajury awarded damages against the
Globe and its reporter in the amount of $2.1 million, absent any
finding of falsity or actual malice, as constitutionally required for
liability against the press for stories involving matters of public
concern.4 2 The award was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, although that Court observed
that with "the clarity granted by hindsight," the identity of the
Globe's sources was "peripheral at best."43
At the far end of the continuum is the situation in which the
confidential sources would not have provided the information to
the reporter absent the promise of confidentiality, but where
either a criminal defendant or a prosecutor is seeking the infor-
mation. Typically, a reporter has interviewed the criminal defen-
dant, on or off the record, and the prosecution believes that the
interview may provide incriminating evidence for use at trial.4 4
In a number of recent notorious cases, such as: the marine pilot
597 (1st Cir. 1980) (same); see also Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555
S.E.2d 175, 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding in case arising from newspaper's
coverage of investigation of Olympic bombing that "ifJewell cannot succeed on
a specific allegation of libel as a matter of law, or if Jewell is able to prove his
specific allegation through the use of available alternative means, then the trial
court's balancing test should favor nondisclosure of confidential sources").
40. See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Dowd
v. Calabrese, 577 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D.D.C. 1983); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co.,
507 F. Supp. 880, 886-87 (D. Haw. 1981).
41. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 13 Mass. L. Rep. 1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 2001).
42. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 2005 Mass. LEXIS 14 (Mass. Feb.
9, 2005). The Globe defendants are considering seeking certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998); In re
Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992).
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whose plane struck a ski lift cable, killing twenty people;4 5 a
defendant in the police sodomization of Abner Louima; the
criminal defense lawyer accused of transmitting terrorist infor-
mation in messages from her jailed client, the Blind Sheik;4 6 and
the lawyer who, in the course of defending Mafia donJohn Gotti,
was accused of violating a gag order 4 7 -the defendants all gave
interviews to the press resulting in subpoenas for unpublished
portions of the interviews. One person gathering information
for a book recently served time in jail for refusing to disclose the
off-the-record portions of her interview with an accused mur-
derer.4 8 Where the information is merely cumulative or the use
is for impeachment or other more incidental purposes, the bal-
ance will not likely shift in favor of the prosecution, particularly if
provided on a confidential basis.49
Where the criminal defendant, rather than the prosecutor,
is seeking what he believes to be exculpatory information for use
at trial, the conflict between two interests of constitutional
dimension-the First and Sixth Amendments-requires a deli-
cate and difficult balance.5" Again, particularly where disclosure
of confidential sources is threatened, a compelling showing by
the criminal defendant that his defense rises or falls on the infor-
mation is required. An in camera review by the trial court of the
evidence to make that determination may be necessary.
Where the reporter is an eyewitness to criminal activity, the
reporter's duty to give evidence, like any other citizen who has
witnessed a crime, is perhaps the most compelling. Of course,
45. United States v. Ashby, General Court-Martial, United States Marine
Corps, Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary, Piedmont Judicial Circuit.
46. United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
47. United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1993).
48. See Howard Kurtz, A Question of Naming Names, WASH. PosT, Oct. 5,
2003, at A01 (noting a Fifth Circuit order affirming contempt citation was
unreported).
49. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76 (1983) (holding where princi-
pal evidentiary purpose of evidence sought from subpoena of reporter is to
impeach credibility, information is cumulative and does not defeat reporter's
First Amendment privilege).
50. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) ("A
defendant's Sixth Amendment and due process fights certainly are not irrele-
vant when ajournalists' privilege is asserted. But rather than affecting the exis-
tence of the qualified privilege, we think that these fights are important factors
that must be considered in deciding whether, in the circumstances of an indi-
vidual case, the privilege must yield to the defendant's need for the informa-
tion."); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) ("The
authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between
First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the
other.").
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
the reporter is often only a witness because he was given access as
a reporter, as were the situations in Branzburg, and that access is
conditioned on non-disclosure of identities of those committing
the crimes. In other situations, the reporter is present in his new-
sgathering capacity but without confidentiality as a pre-condi-
tion. The reporter who witnesses or videotapes a riot scene or an
illegal arrest may be required to hand over notes or footage,
despite the potentially chilling effect on future coverage.
The reporter faces an acute ethical dilemma if his confiden-
tial source has disclosed information of an impending crime
where disclosure to law enforcement of the source might result
in preventing harm. A reporter is likely to provide the informa-
tion necessary to prevent the crime but continue to withhold the
source of the information if disclosure of the source is not neces-
sary in order to prevent bodily harm. These dilemmas are known
and similarly resolved by psychiatrists and lawyers in possession
of patient or client information, not about past crimes, but
future crimes yet to be committed.
Finally, the tension between reporters' need to keep the
confidences of their sources and law enforcement's need to
investigate crimes is perhaps most acute in a leak inquiry, where
the reporter is the eyewitness to the crime of leaking, i.e., where
the communication with the reporter itself is allegedly a crime.
The reporter's information about his confidential source in a
leak inquiry does go to the heart of the criminal investigation
and, presumably, is being sought only after all the potential
sources have been questioned and have denied leaking. But the
"crime," if any, itself is one of disclosure of important informa-
tion of public concern about potential government abuse.
In the case of the two reporters currently held in contempt
for their refusal to reveal to the grand jury their confidential
sources, the inquiry involves whether someone leaked the fact
that Valerie Plame was a covert CIA agent in order to intimidate
her husband, Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who had been sent by
the administration to Niger to investigate a potential sale of yel-
lowcake uranium to Saddam Hussein.5 ' Ambassador Wilson had
published an op-ed column openly critical of the reference in
the President's State of the Union message as overstating the evi-
dence of such a transaction. This evidence was part of the
administration's case for going to war in Iraq.
Both the President and Vice President, along with other
White House officials, had been interviewed by the special prose-
cutor before subpoenas to reporters were issued. The only peo-
51. See supra note 1.
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ple currently facing imprisonment, however, are the New York
Times reporter who did not even write an article and the Time
magazine reporter who published only an online item intended
more to highlight the misuse of this leak to intimidate an Admin-
istration critic, than to further the leaker's possible agenda of
intimidation. Neither reporter was the original recipient of the
leak who first published Plame's CIA status. Nor is it at all clear
that the demanding elements for criminal disclosure of a covert
agent's identity, which is the subject of the underlying investiga-
tion, can or will otherwise be established. At a minimum, forcing
disclosure of confidential sources should only be considered after
a sufficient showing on the merits of the civil or criminal case.
All three judges of the D.C. Circuit found that Branzburg was
not distinguishable and that, despite what one judge described as
the decision's "internal confusion," Branzburg did not recognize
any constitutionally based reporter's privilege that required any
heightened showing before enforcement of a grand jury sub-
poena issued to a reporter.5 2 Two judges believed Branzburg did
not close the door to a reporter's privilege derived from com-
mon law with one judge finding the existence of that privilege
based on "reason and experience," as evidenced by the laws of
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia.5" The common
law privilege articulated by Judge Tatel would require in a leak
case, in addition to a showing of critical necessity and exhaustion
of other sources, a balance between "the public interest in com-
pelling disclosure, measured by the harm that the leak caused,
against the public interest in newsgathering, measured by the
leaked information's value."54 This calculus did not favor the
journalists in the Plame case because of whatJudge Tatel believed
52. A few weeks later, in the context of a grand jury investigation into
alleged leaks regarding the investigation into charities accused of funding ter-
rorism, a judge of the Southern District of New York reviewed the long history
in the Second Circuit recognizing a reporter's privilege in both civil and crimi-
nal cases. While the Second Circuit has had no occasion to rule on the grand
jury context, the court did not find any persuasive distinction between a crimi-
nal trial and a grand jury investigation. Basing the privilege on both the First
Amendment and common law, the court applied the privilege to phone records
of reporters in the custody of third party phone companies and held that the
government must first exhaust other avenues of inquiry, including questioning
government personnel and reviewing their phone records, before compelling
the release of the records. The New York Times Company v. Gonzales, No. 04
Civ. 7677 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2005).
53. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d at 989 (Tatel, C.J.,
concurring).
54. Id. at 998 (Tatel, C.J., concurring).
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was the "slight news value" of the leak compared to its potential
harm.55
Whatever the merits of that particular leak, the "crime" of
leaking, as a general matter, goes to the heart of the role of the
press in our democracy. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed that "[t]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of
the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit gov-
ernment from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw." 6 "The press was protected"5 7
by the Constitution's Framers "so that it could bare the secrets of
the government and inform the people."5 " The Supreme Court
has recognized that there is and must be a First Amendment pro-
tection for newsgathering in order to fulfill that watchdog func-
tion.5 9 Forcing reporters to make the choice "would invite
timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppres-
sion of information that would otherwise be published and that
should be made available to the public."60
The balance set by the First Amendment requires protection
of confidential sources, even if it is at some cost to the enforce-
ment of the law. Anonymous speech has long been identified as
central to democracy, with a lineage dating back to pre-Revolu-
tionary days.6 ' These First Amendment protections extend even
when, as in a leak inquiry, the anonymous speaker has commit-
ted a criminal act in disclosing the information to the press
where the disclosure is of information of compelling public
interest. 6
2
IV. ARGUMENT FOR FEDERAL SHIELD LAW
Despite three decades of federal courts recognizing a First
Amendment privilege for reporters, the recent cases in which
federal courts have held reporters in contempt for refusing to
55. Id. at 1002 (Tatel, CJ., concurring).
56. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980).
57. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black,
J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
60. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
61. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[B]oth Anti-Federalists and Federalists believed that
the freedom of the press included the right to publish without revealing the
author's name.").
62. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding that punishment
for press disclosure of illegally intercepted conversation violated the First
Amendment where the reporter did not participate in the illegal interception
and the matter was of compelling public concern).
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reveal their confidential sources suggest a troubling trend, unless
corrected by the Supreme Court. If courts continue to conclude
that uniform First Amendment protection does not already exist,
or is easily overcome, even when the confidential sources are
involved, Congress should pass a federal shield law to protect
reporters from being forced to choose between reslealing their
confidential sources or facing jail time.
Forty-nine states plus the District of Columbia offer some
form of protection to journalists who refuse to disclose confiden-
tial sources.63 These protections are in the form of either court
decisions or statutes, commonly known as "shield laws," which
recognize the reporter's privilege.64 Foreign jurisdictions have
also recognized that protecting confidential sources is vital to
maintaining a free press.65 Further, since 1972, in the wake of
Branzburg, the Justice Department has had a policy guideline
applicable to federal prosecutors respecting a reporter's privi-
lege.66 The current guideline admonishes:
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the
freedom of reporters to investigate and report the news,
the prosecutorial power of the government should not be
used in such a way that it impairs a reporter's responsibility
to cover as broadly as possible controversial public issues.
This policy statement is thus intended to provide protec-
tion for the news media from forms of compulsory process,
whether civil or criminal, which might impair the news
gathering function.
67
63. Charles Lane, In Leak Case, Reporters Lack Shield for Sources, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 29, 2004, at A01.
64. Id.
65. The countries that are party to the European Convention on Human
Rights recognize qualified protection for confidential sources. See European
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. In
December 2002, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
set aside a subpoena issued to Washington Post reporter Jonathan Randall. The
Appeals Chamber ruled that a two-part test must be satisfied before any war
correspondent can be subpoenaed: "The petitioning party must demonstrate
that the evidence sought is of direct and important value in determining a core
issue in the case" and "that the evidence sought cannot reasonably be obtained
elsewhere." Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Dec. 11, 2002) (decision on
interlocutory appeal), available at http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/ appeal/
decision-e/randal1021211.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy).
66. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10.
67. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10. The policy guideline provides, inter alia: (1) "[all
reasonable attempts should be made to obtain information from alternative
sources before considering issuing a subpoena to a member of the news media"
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Congress is currently considering whether to pass a federal
shield law. Representatives Mike Pence (R. Ind.) and Rick
Boucher (D. Va.) in the House and Senator Richard Lugar (R.
Ind.) in the Senate have proposed the Free Flow of Information
Act of 2005 that would:
* Prohibit testimony to be compelled from a journalist in
criminal cases unless the testimony is "essential to the
investigation, prosecution or defense" of a criminal
case;
* Prohibit testimony to be compelled from ajournalist in
civil cases unless the testimony sought is "essential to a
dispositive issue of substantial importance"; and
* Provide absolute protection of the identity of confiden-
tial sources and prohibit disclosure of information that
would lead to the discovery of the identity of such
sources, including information from third parties.
The shield law proposed could provide absolute protection for
the identity of confidential sources. Anything less would still
leave reporters and sources no real way to know in advance
which sources would be protected and which sources would not.
A federal shield law is not a political issue, as the need to
have an informed citizenry does not fall on either side of the
partisan divide. The events of the past few months have shown
that a federal shield law is needed to protect reporters from
harsh penalties for merely doing theirjobs. A federal shield law
will provide the certainty that a reporter's promise can be kept
without fear of civil or criminal sanctions, independent of the
happenstance of whether the subpoena issues from a state or fed-
eral court.
CONCLUSION
The stakes, as the great Professor Alexander Bickel noted,
could not be higher:
Although the direct censorship of newspapers or broad-
casts would constitute a more blatant-because historically
more familiar and, of course, differently motivated-viola-
tion of the First Amendment [than forcing reporters to
divulge confidential sources], the forcing of disclosure of
(id. § 50.10(b)); (2) "[i]n criminal cases, there should be reasonable grounds
to believe . . . that the information sought is essential to a successful investiga-
tion" (id. § 50.10(f)(1)); and (3) "[t]he use of subpoenas to members of the
news media should, except under exigent circumstances, be limited to the ver-
ification of published information and to such surrounding circumstances as
relate to the accuracy of the published information" (id. § 50.10(f)(4)).
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reporters' confidences is not very different in effect. It is a
form of indirect, and perhaps random, but highly effective
censorship . . . [flor the forced disclosure of reporters'
confidences will abort the gathering and analysis of news,
and thus, of course, restrain its dissemination.68
Just as prior restraint of the press is an anathema to the First
Amendment and democratic principle, so is compelled disclo-
sure of confidential sources which, as Professor Bickel predicts,
would have the same censoring effect, with the specter ofjail dis-
couraging sources and reporters from disclosing information
about matters of vital public concern.
68. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MoRALiTY OF CONSENT 84-85 (1975).
